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Passivity Analysis of Higher Order Evolutionary Dynamics and Population
Games
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Abstract— In population games, a large population of players,
modeled as a continuum, is divided into subpopulations, and the
fitness or payoff of each subpopulation depends on the overall
population composition. Evolutionary dynamics describe how
the population composition changes in response to the fitness
levels, resulting in a closed-loop feedback system. Recent work
established a connection between passivity theory and certain
classes of population games, namely so-called “stable games”.
In particular, it was shown that a combination of stable games
and (an analogue of) passive evolutionary dynamics results in
stable convergence to Nash equilibrium. This paper considers
the converse question of necessary conditions for evolutionary
dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all generalized stable
games. Here, generalization refers to “higher order” games
where the population payoffs may be a dynamic function of the
population state. Using methods from robust control analysis,
we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a
passivity property, then it is possible to construct a generalized
stable game that results in instability. The results are illustrated
on selected evolutionary dynamics with particular attention to
replicator dynamics, which are also shown to be lossless, a
special class of passive systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Population games [1], [2] model interactions among a
large number of players, or agents, in which each agent’s
payoff or fitness depends on its own strategy and the distri-
bution of strategies of other agents. There has been extensive
research in a variety of settings, ranging from societal [3] to
biological [4] to engineered [5].
A central question in population games, as well as the
related topic of learning in games [6]–[8], is understanding
the long run behavior of player strategies. In particular,
under what conditions do population strategies converge to a
solution concept such as Nash equilibrium? The outcome
depends on both the underlying game and the particular
evolutionary dynamics (e.g., [10]), and behaviors can range
from convergence for classes of game/dynamics pairings [11]
to chaos in seemingly simple settings [12]. Furthermore, a
specific game can exhibit inherent obstacles to convergence
for broad classes of evolutionary dynamics [13]. Contrary to
Nash equilibrium, there are relaxed solution concepts, such
as coarse correlated equilibria, that are universally (i.e., for
all games) induced by various forms evolutionary dynamics
[14], [15].
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Of specific interest herein is the class of population games
called stable games [11]. These games exhibit a property
called “self-defeating externalities”. Whenever a segment
of the population revises its strategies, the payoff gains in
the adopted strategy are less than the payoff gains of the
abandoned strategy. It was shown that the class of stable
games results in convergence to Nash equilibrium when
paired with a variety of evolutionary dynamics. Following
work [16] established a connection between stable games
and passivity theory [17]. Generally speaking, it was shown
that stable games exhibit a property related to passivity.
Furthermore, various evolutionary dynamics also exhibit a
form of passivity. Accordingly, since interconnections of
passive dynamical systems exhibit stable behavior, one can
conclude that passive evolutionary dynamics coupled with
stable games exhibit stable behavior.
The connection to passivity enables the opportunity to
analyze in a similar way broader class of both games and
evolutionary dynamics. Of particular interest here are higher
order games and higher order dynamics. In the canonical
models of population games, the fitness of various population
strategies is a static function of the population composition.
In a higher order model, this dependence can be dynamic,
e.g., as a model of path dependencies [16]. Likewise, in
canonical forms of evolutionary dynamics, the number of
states is equal to the number of population strategies. Higher
order dynamics, through the introduction of auxiliary states,
can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors. For example,
instabilities [13] or even chaos [12] can be eliminated
through modifications of standard evolutionary dynamics that
reflect a form of myopic anticipation [18], [19]. Recent work
has shown that higher order variants [20] of the well know
replicator dynamics can lead to the elimination of weakly
dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of
strictly dominated strategies, a property not exhibited by
standard replicator dynamics.
This paper considers the following converse question:
Under what conditions does a evolutionary dynamic stabilize
all stable games? In addressing this question, we will admit
both higher order evolutionary dynamics and higher order
stable games. Using methods from robust control analysis,
we show that if an evolutionary dynamic does not satisfy a
passivity property, then it is possible to construct a higher
order stable game that results in instability. The results
are similar in spirit to prior work on the necessity of a
small gain condition to stabilize certain classes of feedback
interconnections [21]–[23].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II presents preliminary material on population games
and passivity. Section III establishes a necessity condition
for stable interconnection with passive systems. Section IV
specializes the results to population games and presents il-
lustrative simulations. Finally, Section V contains concluding
remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
In this section, some preliminaries and notations form
game theory and passivity theory are provided in order to
establish our results.
A. Passivity theory
Passivity implies useful properties such as stability, and
the importance of passivity as tool in nonlinear control of
interconnected systems—unlike Lyapunov stability criteria—
relays on the fact that any set of passive sub-systems in
parallel or feedback configuration forms a passive system.
In other words, by ensuring that every subsystem is passive,
a complex structure of subsystems can be built to satisfy
certain properties.
Consider Σ to be a nonlinear dynamical system with the
following state space realization:
x˙ = f(x, u) (1)
y = g(x, u),
where, u ∈ Rm is the system’s input vector, y ∈ Rm is the
system’s output vector and x(t) ∈ Rn is the system’s state
vector. Next, we present two definitions for passive system
from both state space and input-output perspectives.
Definition 1: The nonlinear system Σ with state space (1)
is said to be passive if there exist storage function L(x(t))
such that:
L(x(t)) ≤ L(x0) +
∫ t
0
u(τ)T y(τ)dτ. (2)
The input-output definition of passivity property is given
as follows:
Definition 2: The nonlinear system Σ is said to be passive
if there exist constant α such that:
〈Σu, u〉T ≥ α, ∀u ∈ U, T ∈ R+. (3)
where, 〈f, g〉T =
∫ T
0
f(t)T g(t)dt.
Remark: In the case of equality in the inequalities (2) and
(3), the system is said to be lossless.
The stability of the feedback interconnection between
passive systems is a fundamental result in passivity theory
(e.g., [24]). That is, the negative feedback interconnection
between a passive system Σ1 and strictly passive Σ2, as
shown in Fig. 1, is stable feedback interconnection. Also,
the closed loop system from r to y1 is passive.
The following definition defines the δ-passive and the δ-
anti-passive dynamics. The definition was introduced in [16],
where the connection between passivity property and games
were established.
Definition 3: The input-output operator S : U −→ Y is
said to be
Σ1
Σ2
r u1 y1
u2
−
y2
Fig. 1: Negative feedback interconnection.
• δ-passive if there exists a constant α such that:
〈(S˙u), u˙〉T ≥ α, ∀u ∈ U, T ∈ R+.
• input strictly δ-passive if there exists a constant α and
β > 0 such that
〈(S˙u), u˙〉T ≥ α+ β〈(u˙), u˙〉T , ∀u ∈ U, T ∈ R+.
• δ-anti-passive if −S is δ-passive.
The following proposition derives the relationship between
passivity and δ-passivity for linear systems. Consider the
linear time invariant (LTI) system with R as an input-output
mapping and the following state space representation:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) +Du(t), x(0) = x0,
(4)
where, A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, C ∈ Rm×n, and D ∈
R
m×m
.
Proposition 1: The input-output mapping R is passive if
and only if it is δ-passive.
Proof: The positive real lemma (e.g., [25, p. 70])
implies that the input-output mapping R with the associated
transfer function R(s) =
[
A B
C D
]
is positive real if and
only if exist a matrix P > 0, such that the following linear
matrix inequality (LMI):[
ATP + PA PB − CT
BTP − C −(D +DT )
]
≤ 0, (5)
holds.
Since δ-passive systems are defined for continuously def-
erentiable inputs and outputs, then the state space represen-
tation for mapping from u˙ to y˙ can be obtained from the
derivative of the state space representation (4) as follows:
˙̂x(t) = Ax̂(t) +Bû(t)
ŷ(t) = Cx̂(t) +Dû(t), x̂(0) = x̂0,
(6)
where, x̂ = x˙, ŷ = y˙ and û = u˙. It is clear that the state
space representation (6) has the same input-output mapping
R =
[
A B
C D
]
, which implies that the LMI (5) is the same
for the system (6). This implies that the input-output mapping
R =
[
A B
C D
]
is passive from u˙ to y˙ (i.e., δ-passive) if
and only if exist a matrix P > 0 the LMI (5) holds. This
completes the proof.
B. Stable Games
A game G, in general, consist of three basic elements.
Number of players N : are the decision makers in the game
context. Strategies S: are the set of actions that a particular
player will play given a set of conditions and circumstances
that will emerge in the game being played. Payoff P : is the
reward which a player receives from playing at a particular
strategy.
A population game has a set of strategies S = {1, 2, ...,m}
and a set of strategy distributions X = {x : Σi∈Sxi = 1}.
Since strategies lie in the simplex, admissible changes in
strategy are restricted to the tangent space TX = {z ∈ Rm :∑
i∈s zi = 0}.
A state x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium if each strategy in
the support of x receives the maximum payoff available to
the population.
The definition of stability in this context implies that there
is an evolutionary stable state i.e., rest point, where the
distance between the population distribution and this rest
point decreases along the population trajectories, i.e., the
population converge to this stable state. Therefore, unstable
feedback loop between learning rule and game means that
the feedback will not converge to a rest point.
We now recall the definition of stable games for continu-
ously differentiable games as presented in [11], [16]. First,
define F (x) : S −→ Rm to be the payoff function that
associate each strategy distribution in S with a payoff vector
so that Fi : S −→ Rm is the payoff to strategy i ∈ S. Also,
define DF (x) to be the Jacobian matrix of F (x).
Definition 4: Suppose that F (x) is continuously differen-
tiable. Then F is said to be stable game if
zTDF (x)z ≤ 0, ∀z ∈ TX.
More detailed discussions on stable games and there dynam-
ics are given in [11], [16].
The relationship between passivity and stable games is
established in [16]. That is, let X denote locally Lipschitz
X-valued functions over R+ and P denote locally Lipschitz
R
m
-valued functions over R+.
Theorem 1 ( [16]): A continuously differentiable stable
game mapping X to P is δ-anti-passive game.
C. Higher-order dynamics and games
In the continuous-time standard evolutionary dynamics
and games, the game is static mapping from strategies X
to payoffs P ,
P = F (x),
and the dynamics are restricted first order mapping from
payoffs P to strategies X ,
x˙ = V (x, p).
The dynamical view of this feedback loop can be extend
to a mapping of strategy trajectories to payoff trajectories.
This viewpoint allows us to introduce generalized forms of
dynamics and games, such as higher-order dynamics and
games, to generate these trajectories.
Higher-order dynamics can be introduced—independent
of the game—through auxiliary states to the the first or-
der dynamics [18], [19], which can be interpreted as path
dependency. Also, similar higher-dynamics, but depends on
the game, can be obtained by the direct derivative of the
first order dynamics [20]. It has been shown in [12], [13],
[18]–[20] that the modification of the standard dynamics
can exhibit qualitatively different behaviors. One form of
generalized higher-order dynamics obtained by an auxiliary
state z is given as follows:
z˙ = f(z, p)
x = g(z).
Similarly, static games can be generalized by introducing
internal dynamics into the game. This concept is illustrated in
[16] through dynamically modified payoff function coupled
with the static game. Therefore, we view the higher-order
games as a generalization of standard games by introducing
internal dynamics into the game, i.e., dynamical system
mapping from strategies X to payoffs P .
III. NECESSITY CONDITIONS FOR STABLE
INTERCONNECTION WITH PASSIVE SYSTEMS
This section establishes the following necessity condition:
If a system Σ1 is stable in the negative feedback interconnec-
tion with all passive systems, then, Σ1 must be passive. To
prove this statement, we recall a necessity result for a small
gain condition [26]. We first consider linear systems followed
with a linearization based result of nonlinear systems.
A. Small Gain Theorem
The following proposition provides the necessity condi-
tions for feedback interconnected systems with small gain
property. The result is part of the small gain theorem pro-
vided in [26].
Proposition 2 ( [26]): For any stable system S, associ-
ated transfer function matrix S(s) =
[
As Bs
Cs Ds
]
with
H-infinity norm ‖S(jω)‖∞ > 1, there exists a transfer
function matrix ∆(s) =
[
A∆ B∆
C∆ D∆
]
with H-infinity
norm ‖∆(jω)‖∞ < 1, such that the closed loop feedback
is unstable. 
For completeness, we recall the proof in [26] in order
to utilize the explicit construction of a destabilizing ∆(s).
The closed loop feedback between [S(s),∆(s)] is unstable
if det(I + S(s)∆(s)) = 0, i.e., it is sufficient to construct
∆(s) with ‖∆(jω)‖∞ < 1 such that det(I+S(s)∆(s)) = 0.
Suppose that ω0 ∈ (0,∞) where ‖S(jω0)‖∞ = σ1 > 1.
Let the singular value decomposition (SVD) of S(jω0) to be
UΣV ∗, where U =
[
u1 u2 · · ·
]
and V =
[
v1 v2 · · ·
]
are unitary matrices. We can rewrite u∗1 and v1 as
u∗1 =
[
u11e
jθ1 u12e
jθ2 · · ·
]
and
v1 =
v11e
jφ1
v12e
jφ2
.
.
.
 ,
where θi, φi ∈ (−pi, 0) and
θi = ∡
βi − jω0
βi + jω0
φi,= ∡
αi − jω0
αi + jω0
.
Now define
∆(s) =
1
σ1

v11
α1 − s
α1 + s
v12
α2 − s
α2 + s
.
.
.

[
u11
β1 − s
β1 + s
u12
β2 − s
β2 + s
· · ·
]
.
This construction of ∆(s) ensures that
‖∆(jω)‖∞ =
1
σ
< 1.
It follows that at s = jω0, ∆(jω0) =
1
σ
v1u
∗
1 and hence
det(I + S(jω0)∆jω0) = det(I + UΣV
∗
1
σ
v1u
∗
1) = 0.
This completes the proof.
In other words, Proposition 2 can be read as follows: if a
system Σ1 is stable in the feedback interconnection with all
small gain systems, then Σ1 must have small gain property.
Following Proposition 2, we recall the relationship be-
tween passivity and small gain property (e.g., [24]), in order
to provide similar result for passive systems.
The passivity-small gain relationship is known as follows:
Lemma 1 ( [24]): Suppose that (G(s) + I) is invertible,
then an LTI system S(s) has small gain property, i.e.,
‖S‖∞ < 1, if and only if G(s) is passive system, where,
S(s) = (G(s) − I)(G(s) + I)−1. (7)
Now, we are ready to provide the necessity part for linear
passive systems.
Theorem 2: For any LTI stable strictly non-passive system
G(s), there exists strictly passive system R(s) such that the
closed loop feedback between [G(s), R(s)] is unstable. 
Proof: Let G, S, ∆ and R denote G(s), S(s), ∆(s)
and R(s) respectively. Suppose that G is non-passive transfer
function with G+I invertible. Using (7), it implies that there
exist S such that:
S = (G− I)(G+ I)−1 and ‖S‖∞ > 1.
Using Theorem 2, it follows that these exist ∆ such ‖∆‖∞ <
1 and the closed loop [S,∆] is unstable. This implies that:
det(I + S∆) = 0.
However, ‖∆‖∞ < 1 implies that there exist passive system
R such that:
∆ = (R − I)(R+ I)−1. (8)
Higher-order Learning Rule
Higher-order Game
P X
X
+
P
Fig. 2: Feedback interconection of higher-order dynamic and
generlaized game, where P is the payoffs and X is the
strategies.
This implies that:
det(I + S∆) = 0
⇒ det
(
I + (G− I)(G+ I)−1(R− I)(R + I)−1
)
= 0
⇒ det
(
I + (G− I)(G+ I)−1(R+ I)−1(R− I)
)
= 0
⇒ det((R+ I)(G + I))
× det ((R+ I)(G+ I) + (R− I)(G − I)) = 0
⇒ det (RG+G+R+ I +RG−G−R+ I) = 0
⇒ det (2RG+ 2I) = 0
⇒ det (RG+ I) = 0,
which implies the closed loop [G,R] is unstable. This
completes the proof.
Remark: The statement of Theorem 2 is equivalent to the
following statement: Suppose that G is LTI stable system
and forms stable feedback interconnection with all passive
systems, then G must be passive.
IV. PASSIVITY ANALYSIS FOR HIGHER-ORDER
DYNAMICS AND GAMES
In this section, we focus on passivity analysis of the
higher-order evolutionary dynamics and games. As shown in
Fig. 2, games and evolutionary dynamics can be illustrated
as a feedback interconnection. We will show that if an
evolutionary dynamic or a learning rule is non-δ-passive,
then it is possible to construct higher-order δ-anti-passive
game that results in instability. In other words, a learning rule
results in stability for all higher-order δ-anti-passive games
if and only if the learning rule is δ-passive.
The following theorem provides necessity conditions for
passive feedback interconnections of Higher-order learning
rule and higher-order game as an analogy to Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: If the linearization of the Higher-order learn-
ing rule is not δ-passive, then there exist δ-anti-passive game
that results in unstable positive feedback interconnection.
Proof:
Passive systems in negative feedback interconnection are
equivalent to anti-passive systems in positive feedback inter-
connection. Also, Proposition 1 implies that passivity and
δ-passivity are equivalent for linear systems. That is, if
the learning rule is not δ-passive, then it is not passive.
Therefore, using Theorem 2, it follows that it is possible to
construct δ-anti-passive to destabilize a given non-δ-passive
learning rule.
In the next subsections, we will focus on the passivity
analysis of two familiar classes of higher-order dynamics,
Logit dynamics and replicator dynamics.
A. Second order Logit dynamics
Roughly speaking, the logit learning rule can be consid-
ered as a noisy version of the best response dynamics. In
this dynamic, the change in the strategies of the players
depend on the level of their knowledge about the game and
the strategies currently played [27].
The second order logit dynamics can be obtained by
introducing an auxiliary state in the payoff function as
follows:
x˙i = −xi +
ep̂i∑
j e
p̂j
(9a)
˙̂pi = −p̂i + pi, (9b)
where, x is the state vector, p is the payoff and p̂ is the
introduced auxiliary state. The equilibrium conditions are
p̂ = p and xi = σmax(p̂i).
First, we show that the linearization of (9) is non-passive
system. Hence, according to our results, it is possible to
construct higher-order passive game that results in instability
with the second order Logit dynamics. The linearized system
is given as follows:
δx˙ = Axδx+ βδp̂ (10a)
δ ˙̂p = Apδp̂+Bpδp, (10b)
where, δx = x − x∗ is the deviation from equilibrium,
Ax = Ap = −I , β =
1
m

1 −1 −1 · · ·
−1 1 −1 · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−1 −1 · · · 1
, m is the
number of pure strategies and Bp = I . The linearized logit
dynamics (10) is a linear second order dynamical system and
its transfer function has relative degree equal two, i.e., the
linearized logit dynamics is not passive.
Before we analyze the linearized logit dynamics (10) and
construct a higher-order game that results in unstable feed-
back interconnection, we will reduce the linearized dynamics
using the transformation δx = δx∗+Nδw, δp = δp∗+Nδq
and p̂ = Nξ, where δx∗, p∗ is the equilibrium point, N is the
null space of a vector of ones and satisfies NTN = I . This
projection ensure that the dynamics stays in the simplex. The
reduced linear dynamical system is given as follows:[
δw˙
ξ˙
]
=
[
−I NTβN
0 −I
] [
δw
ξ
]
+
[
0
I
]
δq. (11a)
Now, consider the case where i = 1, 2, 3 and let δW =[
δw
ξ
]
. The reduced dynamical system (11) is given as
follows:
δW˙ =

−1 0 23 0
0 −1 0 23
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1
 δW +

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
 δq (12a)
δy =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
δW, (12b)
which is non-passive dynamical system G(s) with the fol-
lowing transfer function matrix:
G(s) =
[
2
3(s+1)2 0
0 23(s+1)2
]
. (13)
The construction mechanism provided in this paper will be
employed to construct a passive system (game) that result in
unstable feedback loop with the second order logit dynamics.
The internal dynamics of the constructed passive game is
given as follows:
z˙ = Agz +Bgug (14a)
yg = Cgz +Dgug, (14b)
where,
Ag =

0 −0.8608 0 0
1.0000 −1.0791 0 0
0 0 0 −0.8608
0 0 1.0000 −1.0791
 ,
Bg =

0 0
10 10
0 0
10 10
 , Cg = [0 16 0 00 0 0 16
]
,
Dg =
[
5.2020 −4.7980
−4.7980 5.2020
]
.
The internal dynamics of the game (14) is passive mapping
from ug to yg . The feedback interconnection between the
game and the logit dynamic implies that ug = δw and yg =
δq. Using Proposition 1, it follows that the above game is
δ-passive from δw˙ to δq˙. This implies that there is a storage
function L(z, q) such that:
L(z, q)− L(0, 0) ≤
∫ t
0
δw˙T (τ)δq˙(τ)dτ. (15)
Also, the transformations X = X∗ + Nδw and P = P ∗ +
Nδq, implies that X˙T P˙ = δw˙NTNδq˙ = δw˙δq˙. Using (15),
it follows that the game (14) is δ-passive from X˙ to P˙ .
Hence, the higher-order δ-passive game from strategies X
to payoff P is given as follows:
X = X∗ +Nδw (16a)
z˙ = Agz +Bgδw (16b)
P = P ∗ +N(Cgz +Dδw). (16c)
Proposition 1 implies that the dynamics (12) is not δ-passive.
Also, using the fact that X˙T P˙ = δw˙δq˙, it follows that the
dynamics (12) is not δ-passive from X˙ to P˙ . Hence, accord-
ing to Theorem 3, the feedback interconnection between the
constructed δ-anti-passive and the non-δ-passive dynamics
result in instability. Figs. 3 and 4 shows the evolution
of the states of the feedback interconnection between the
constructed game, which is δ-anti-passive, and the second
order non-δ-passive logit dynamics (9).
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Fig. 3: The evolution of the states of the constructed δ-anti-
passive game in feedback loop with the non-δ-passive second
order logit dynamics (9) projected into the simplex.
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Fig. 4: The evolution of the states of the constructed δ-anti-
passive game in feedback loop with the non-δ-passive second
order logit dynamics (9).
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B. Replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics are important class of evolutionary
dynamics, which emerges originally from system biology and
nature evolution [28]. It provides way to represent selection
among a population of diverse types.
First, we show that first order replicator dynamics are
indeed passive dynamics. In particular, replicator dynamics
belongs to special class of passive systems known as lossless
systems.
The replicator dynamics is given as follows:
x˙i = xi(pi −
∑
j
xjpj), (17)
where pi is the payoff for using strategy i.
Let x∗ to be a Nash equilibrium for the dynamic. Define
exi = xi − x
∗
i to be the deviation from the equilibrium. The
following theorem shows that first order replicator dynamics
from the payoff pi to the error exi belongs to a special class
of passive systems named lossless systems.
Theorem 4: Replicator dynamic mapping from pi to exi
is passive lossless.
Proof: Using exi = xi − x∗i , the replicator dynamic
equation (17) can be written as follows:
e˙xi = (exi + x
∗
i )(pi −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )pj). (18)
Define the following storage function,
V (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
. (19)
Note that V (0) = 0, and
V (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i ln
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
≥ − ln
∑
i
x∗i
exi + x
∗
i
x∗i
=
∑
i
xi = 1,
i.e., V (ex) ≥ 0.
Now, the derivative of the storage function is given as
follows:
V˙ (ex) = −
∑
i
x∗i
1
exi + x
∗
i
e˙xi
= −
∑
i
x∗i (pi −
∑
j
(exj + x
∗
j )pj)
= −
∑
i
x∗i pi +
∑
i
x∗i (
∑
j
exjpj +
∑
j
x∗jpj)
= −
∑
i
x∗i pi +
∑
j
exjpj +
∑
j
x∗jpj
=
∑
j
exjpj .
This implies that replicator dynamics is passive (lossless)
system.
It is known that replicator dynamics can exhibit different
behaviors, that is stable, null stable and unstable depending
on the game, (e.g., [11]). For example one can show that rock
paper scissors game with replicator dynamics can generate
these three different behaviors. These behaviors can be seen
as a consequences of the lossless property of the replicator
dynamics.
One can show that the linearization of the first order
replicator dynamic results in a single integrator. Now, we
will show that the second order replicators are non-passive
dynamics, as the linearization result in double integrator
(double poles at the origin). Hence, according to our result
in this paper, it is possible to construct higher-order game
that result in instability with the second order replicator
dynamics.
The second order replicator dynamics can be obtained by
introducing auxiliary state p̂ in the payoff function. This
results in the following dynamics:
x˙i = xi(p̂i −
∑
j
xj p̂j) (20a)
˙̂pi = pi. (20b)
The equilibrium conditions are p∗i = 0, x∗i = σmax(p̂∗i ), and
p̂∗i = 1 .
The linearization of the replicator dynamics (20) is given
as follows:
δx˙ = Aδx+ βδp̂
δ ˙̂p = δp,
where, A =

−x∗1 −x
∗
1 · · · −x
∗
1
−x∗2 −x
∗
2 · · · −x
∗
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−x∗n −x
∗
n · · · −x
∗
n
, β = I−x∗x∗T and
x∗ is any point in the simplex. The reduced system can be
obtained using the transformation δx = δx∗ + Nδw, δp =
δp∗ +Nδq and δp̂ = Nξ as follows:
δw˙ = NTANδw +NTβNξ
ξ˙ = δq.
Now, consider the case where n = 3 and x∗i = 13 ,
[
δw˙
ξ˙
]
=

0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
[δwξ
]
+

0 0
0 0
1 0
0 1
 δq (21a)
δy =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
] [
δw
ξ
]
. (21b)
The system (21) is a double integrator, which is not passive.
Accordingly, one can construct higher-order passive game
that results in instability with the second order replicator
dynamics. For instance, the higher-order game can be con-
structed as follows:
X = X∗ +Nδw
z˙ =
[
−1 0
0 −1
]
z +
[
1 0
0 1
]
δw
P = P ∗ +N
[
−1 0
0 −1
]
z.
Similarly, as in logit dynamics in the previous section, one
can show that the above game δ-anti-passive from strategies
X to payoff P .
Figs. 5 and 6 shows the evolution of the states of the
positive feedback interconnection between the constructed
game, which is δ-anti-passive, and second order non-δ-
passive replicator dynamic (20).
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Fig. 5: The evolution of the states of the constructed δ-anti-
passive game in feedback loop with the non-δ-passive second
order replicator dynamics (20).
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Fig. 6: The evolution of the states of the constructed δ-anti-
passive game in feedback loop with the non-δ-passive second
order replicator dynamics (20) projected into the simplex.
.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, passivity analysis for higher order dynamics
and games has been presented. The necessary conditions
for evolutionary dynamics to exhibit stable behaviors for all
higher-order passive games is provided. Methods from robust
control analysis are used to show that if an evolutionary
dynamic does not satisfy the passivity property, then it
is possible to construct a higher-order passive game that
results in unstable feedback loop. The results is employed
to construct a higher-order passive games for two different
dynamics to illustrate the feedback passivity concept in
games.
One can conclude similar result (under some detailed con-
ditions) for the nonlinear passive dynamics by constructing
linear non-passive system that result in instability with the
linearization of the nonlinear system. In other words, the
following conjecture is true under some detailed conditions:
Conjecture: If a nonlinear system is locally non-passive,
i.e., the linearization around an equilibrium point (x0, u0) is
non-passive, then it is possible to construct a passive linear
system that results in instability with the nonlinear system.
This conjecture was illustrated in our discussion on higher-
order dynamics and games.
Similar investigation for first order dynamics was con-
ducted in [9]. They considered similar question raised in
this paper, but for class of standard learning dynamics from
passivity perspective. Implications of stability for various
passive dynamics both analytically and by means of numer-
ical simulations was discussed.
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